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Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game 
with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior 
equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public 
goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously 
imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a 
range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test if thresholds perform better if they are 
endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may 
facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does 
have signaling and commitment effects but they are not strong enough to significantly 
improve the efficiency of thresholds. 
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In some cases, public goods have a threshold, i.e. a minimal project size, for technological
reasons - building half a bridge does not make much sense - but in other cases, the public
good can be provided continuously - think of donations to start a community library. This
paper investigates if introducing a threshold to a public good that does not have a specic
threshold value for technological reasons can increase eciency.1 More specically, we ask
if such thresholds are more eective if they have been approved in a referendum rather
than just imposed by some authority.
The issue we investigate is of potential relevance in both the small and the large. For
example, consider a fundraising drive to start the community library. Will citizens donate
more if the charity commits to a minimal size of the library than if the fundraising drive
is started without any lower boundary for the size of the library? To provide an example
from the other end of the scale, consider international agreements to abate greenhouse
gases. Would nations be willing to contribute more to prevent global warming if the
international agency commits to a minimum target for abatement? Are nations more
likely to reach the threshold if they approved of the threshold in a referendum than if the
threshold was suggested by some international organization? These examples illustrate
that our study refers to situations in which potential contributors to the public good can be
identied and, therefore, contributors can vote on the threshold but the central authority
is weak and does not have the power to enforce contributions to the public good. In the
examples above, the charity cannot force citizens to donate, the international organization
cannot force sovereign states to reduce greenhouse gases. The mechanism we investigate
is therefore a potential remedy to the free rider problem when no strong enforcement
institution exists and when the players keep the full decision sovereignty on whether or
not to contribute to the public good. All that is required is that an institution can credibly
commit not to provide the public good if voluntary contributions are insucient to meet
the threshold.
The theoretical rationale for expecting that introducing a threshold increases eciency
is that a threshold transforms a public goods game with a unique and inecient equi-
librium into a coordination game with a set of additional equilibria in which all players
are better o (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989). The intuition for why this transformation may
increase eciency is that a player's contribution can be essential for whether the public
good is provided at all.2 If a single player makes the dierence between providing the
1Threshold public goods are also called step-level, binary, discrete, lumpy, or provision point goods.
2Note that we investigate the eect of introducing a threshold in the sense of the minimal project
size. In a situation without a threshold, the provision of the public good is continuous and proportional
to the aggregate contributions. In contrast, in a situation with a threshold, the public good is provided
if contributions meet or exceed the threshold but is not provided at all if the threshold is not met. If
1public good at the threshold level versus none at all, he may nd it in his best interest
to contribute. However, this situation typically occurs if others make contributions such
that the threshold is \almost" reached, i.e. if it is feasible (and not too costly) for a
particular player to \make the dierence". If others already contribute more than the
threshold (and the public good is provided anyway) or if they contribute too little for a
single player to make the dierence between provision or not (i.e. the public good is not
provided anyway), free riding is optimal for a self-interested player. Thus, thresholds only
improve incentives to cooperate if players manage to solve a coordination problem.
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the eect of voting on thresholds, i.e.
of choosing the level of the threshold in a vote. In particular, we ask if eciency is
higher (because coordination is more successful) when a threshold has been approved in
a referendum rather than exogenously imposed. Our hypothesis is that strong electoral
support for a threshold improves coordination because it serves to \signal" a willingness
to contribute, i.e. widespread support is a reduced form of communication which shapes
expectations. To illustrate, suppose that in a referendum all N voters support threshold
level T. It seems plausible in a symmetric game (for reasons of focality and inequality
aversion) to assume that, upon learning the result of the referendum, all players expect T
to be reached and that all players contribute T=N.3 In contrast, if only a small majority
votes for T, players may hold the belief that some voters will contribute less than T=N
each. This may result in contribution of more than T=N by player i (if he thinks he is
essential) or in zero contributions (if he thinks aggregate contributions are too low such
that his contribution would make a dierence). Thus, the signaling eect is theoretically
ambiguous and the eciency-enhancing eect of voting on thresholds is a fundamentally
empirical issue which can be systematically investigated only in the experimental labora-
tory (e.g. Falk and Heckman 2009). However, isolating the signaling eect is demanding
even in the laboratory because psychological and statistical selection eects may add to
the signaling eect. For example, those voting for threshold T may contribute T=N not
because they think it is a best reply to what others do but because they feel committed to
comply with a rule they supported. An additional eect results from statistical selection.
If players are intrinsically more or less cooperative, and cooperative players tend to vote
for higher thresholds, players with higher levels of cooperativeness will select into higher
contributions exceed the threshold, the public good is again continuous and proportional to aggregate
contributions, as in a situation without a threshold. This property is also called the \extended benets
rule" which tends to induce relatively high contributions compared to rules in which contributions beyond
the threshold are simply wasted (no rebate) or returned (full rebate) to the participants. See Marks and
Croson (1998) for a comparison of these rules and Spencer et al. (2008) for a systematic discussion of
alternative rebate rules.
3This conjecture is supported by a substantial body of research on social dilemmas showing that under
conditions of strategic uncertainty, group members tacitly coordinate their choice behavior by anchoring
their decisions on rules of fairness (e.g. Allison et al. 1992, Suleiman et al. 2001).
2thresholds.
We systematically test the hypothesis that approving of a threshold in a referendum
improves the eectiveness of thresholds in a two-stage game for dierent threshold levels
(low, intermediate or high) and for dierent refund rates (no, partial or full refund).
In stage one, the players vote on implementing a threshold. The players know that if
they accept, the public good will be provided only if their total contributions in stage
two reach or exceed the threshold. In stage two, upon learning the outcome of the
vote, the players make contribution decisions. If a positive threshold is approved, there
is a set of equilibria in pure strategies where the threshold is exactly met. Because
these equilibria Pareto-dominate the equilibrium of the standard public good game, it
is a weakly dominant strategy to vote for the threshold in stage one. Variation of the
threshold level is interesting because both benets and costs of coordination increase
with the threshold. Higher thresholds are more ecient if they are reached but players
may be less condent that they can be reached, which increases the risk of \wasting"
their contribution on a project that turns out not to be implemented.4 Because of this
trade-o, intermediate thresholds may be more ecient than high thresholds, and our
experiment allows us to investigate if more ambitious thresholds are more or less ecient
than low or intermediate thresholds. We also test the hypothesis at various refund rates
(no, partial and full refund) in case the project is not realized. A refund provides partial
or full insurance against the risk of \wasting" one's contribution on a project that is
not realized. Clearly, such insurance reduces the cost of miscoordination, and we expect
better coordination at higher refund rates.
Our main ndings are that thresholds are counterproductive if exogenously imposed
and if less than full insurance is provided. When full insurance is provided, exogenous
thresholds cease to be counterproductive and become merely ineective as eciency is
the same with no, low or high thresholds. While higher thresholds are generally asso-
ciated with higher contributions, the contributions often do not increase suciently to
match the more ambitious thresholds. Higher thresholds induce the belief that others will
more generously contribute which increases contributions somewhat, but these beliefs are
excessively optimistic. As a result, contributions often fail to meet the threshold.
When thresholds are endogenously chosen in a referendum, we nd that thresholds are
more popular with full insurance and that intermediate thresholds are more popular than
ambitious ones. Thus, voting patterns reect the (anticipated) risk of coordination failure
when a threshold is ambitious and insurance unavailable. We do nd that approving of
a threshold serves as a coordination device in the sense that expected contributions for
chosen thresholds are higher than for imposed ones, and this eect is more pronounced
4A reason might be that the set of asymmetric Pareto-ecient equilibria shrinks with increasing
threshold levels.
3if the threshold receives stronger support among other voters. However, these eects
are weak and cannot signicantly reduce the massive coordination failure we observe in
our design. As a result, overall eciency does not increase when participants choose a
threshold compared to the case when it has been imposed. Thus, introducing a threshold
- whether by at or in a referendum - is not an eective cure for the ineciency in the
provision of public goods in our framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. Related literature is discussed in section 2, section
3 explains the experimental design. In section 4 we further discuss the predictions and
hypotheses. Section 5 reports the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Mounting experimental evidence shows that voluntary cooperation often results in
inecient outcomes absent institutional remedies (see Ledyard 1995, for a survey).
Cooperation-enhancing institutions that have been studied in the lab include competi-
tion between teams (e.g. Reuben and Tyran 2009), punishment of free riding in the guise
of informal sanctions (e.g. Fehr and G achter 2000), redistribution (Sausgruber and Tyran
2007, Charness et al. 2006), or exclusion (Cinyabuguma et al. 2005). An obvious alter-
native to resolve the problem of voluntary contribution is to delegate power to a central
authority with the competence to enforce contributions or to change incentives such that
contributing is optimal for a self-interested player (e.g. through taxation, subsidies or
matching grants). If such incentives are optimally set, it is matter of individual rational-
ity to contribute optimally (e.g. Tyran and Feld 2006). There is an extensive literature
on tax and subsidy mechanisms, in particular incentive-compatible mechanisms.5 These
studies are concerned with \pure" public goods problems, i.e. that have a unique free-
riding equilibrium. An important dierence to our approach is that such mechanisms
require institutions that are able to enforce taxes and transfers between the players.
However, such institutions may not pre-exist but have to be created by players. A
recent literature investigates the endogenous formation of institutions. For example, Kos-
feld et al. (2008) show that a subset of players may successfully implement a costly
5For a survey see Laont (1987). The well-known Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Groves and Ledyard,
1977) levies a tax on choices with externalities on others; it yields an ecient level of the public good
given that true preferences are revealed. For experimental tests of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism see
Smith (1979), Harstad and Marrese (1981) and (1982), and Chen and Plott (1996). In the Falkinger
mechanism the central authority sanctions negative and rewards positive deviations from the average
contribution to the public good (Falkinger 1996). Falkinger et al. (2000) have shown in an experiment
that the mechanism is capable to produce ecient levels of contributions. Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996)
have proposed a similar approach and Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) provide a comparison of the two
mechanisms.
4organization to provide a public good. G urerk et al. (2006) show that people may opt
for an institution with sanctioning possibilities to protect themselves against free riding.
Putterman et al. (2009) provide participants with a menu of tax bases, tax exemptions
and tax rates to investigate if participants are able to select a combination that induces
rational and self-interested participants to contribute eciently in a standard public goods
game (they overwhelmingly do). Tyran and Feld (2006) nd that experimental subjects
also tend to accept non-deterrent sanctions when deterrent sanctions are not available,
and that such non-deterrent sanctions increase eciency if they have been enacted in a
referendum rather than imposed exogenously. Ertan et al. (2009) allow subjects to vote
on the rules governing punishment. They observe that subjects disallow punishment of
above-average contributions and that the institutional structure, which gets subsequently
implemented in the vote, tends to increase eciency. What is common to these approaches
is that they all require the imposition of sanctions on free riders. In contrast, the threshold
mechanism proposed in this study does not require any sanctioning institution.
The eects of exogenously imposed threshold levels have been extensively studied in
the experimental literature, but not, to the best of our knowledge, the eects of endoge-
nous thresholds. The previous literature tends to nd rather mixed results on imposed
thresholds. For example, the literature review of Croson and Marks (2000) shows that
results of previous studies have varied widely with success rates ranging between 10%
and 82%.6 This meta-study shows that coordination tends to be more successful with
a high ratio of total benets of the public good to its costs 7, with higher refund rates
and communication. Leadership contributions and other possibilities to choose sequen-
tially also seem to increase the eectiveness of thresholds (e.g., List and Rondeau 2003,
Cadsby and Maynes 1999, Coats et al. 2009). Controlled evidence from the eld seems
to support these ndings (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002). Rondeau et al. (2005) report
higher eciency under a threshold mechanism when contributions below the target are
fully refunded.
Closely related to our study are a eld and lab experiment by Rondeau and List (2008)
and a theoretical contribution by Gerber and Wichardt (2008). Rondeau and List (2008)
investigate (among other things) the eect of introducing a threshold into a public good
that does not have a threshold for technological reasons (a fundraising drive by the Sierra
Club to provide environmental education) in a eld experiment under conditions very
similar to our lab study (contributions are fully refunded, i.e. r = 1 if the threshold
is not met and the \extended benet rule" that we use in all treatments applies). In
6Our denition of a threshold as a minimum project size (allowing for project sizes exceeding the
threshold) diers from some experimental studies surveyed in Croson and Marks (2000) which dene the
threshold as the only feasible project size.
7Note that we hold this ratio, which is also called the step return, constant at a level of 1.5 across all
conditions.
5line with our results, the authors nd that a higher threshold level (USD 2500 vs. USD
5000) increased donations, but the increase was insignicant and donations (USD 945 vs.
USD 1375) were in both cases clearly insucient to meet the threshold. The authors
also implement a one-shot game in the lab with thresholds levels at USD 22.50 vs. USD
45. Now, contributions increase signicantly (USD 5.4 vs. USD 7.5) but the increase is
again less-than-proportional compared to the increase in the threshold (39% vs. 100%).
We infer from these numbers (the paper does not say) that the \success rate" must have
fallen with the threshold level, i.e. that higher thresholds were counterproductive in this
sense. Gerber and Wichardt (2008) suggest a mechanism to provide a public good in the
absence of sanctioning institutions. In their two-stage game, the players choose to pay a
deposit in stage one. The deposit is lost unless a player contributes to the public good.
Hence, the deposit serves as a commitment device that renders contributing to the public
good a dominant strategy.
3 Experimental design
Our design has 6 treatments which vary along 2 dimensions (see Table 1). We vary (i)
whether thresholds T are imposed (EXO) or endogenously chosen in a majority vote
(END) and (ii) the refund rate r across treatments. Each subject only participates in one
treatment, i.e., a subject makes choices either in EXO or END and with only one of the
refund rates. The numbers in parentheses in Table 1 show the number of participants in
each condition. For example, we had 36 subjects participating in condition END0, which
means that these subjects voted over threshold levels (END) and received no refund in
case a threshold was not met (r = 0). The next two sections explain parameters and
procedures in EXO and END, respectively.
Table 1: Treatments of the experiment (number of subjects per cell in parenthesis)
Refund rate
Decision mode 0% 50% 100%
END0 END50 END100
END
(#Subj.: 36) (#Subj.: 36) (#Subj.: 36)
EXO0 EXO50 EXO100
EXO
(#Subj.: 36) (#Subj.: 33) (#Subj.: 33)
63.1 Imposed thresholds (EXO)
Treatments in EXO implement a standard version of the threshold public goods game
(see Isaac, et al. 1989). Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of N = 3. We use
\partner" matching, i.e. groups remain constant throughout the experiment. The subjects
are endowed with E = 20 experimental points and decide how many of these point to
keep or contribute to a public good. The payos are determined by
i =
(




j cj  T
E   ci + rci; if
P
j cj < T;
(1)
where i is subject i's payo in points, ci is i's contribution to the public good, and T is
the threshold. If the sum of contributions within a group reaches or exceeds the threshold,
each subject receives  = 0:5 times this sum as payo from the public good in addition
to the amount kept, E   ci. If the sum of contributions fails to meet the threshold, the
public good is not provided and contributions are refunded at the rate r, with 0  r  1.
The parameter  is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good.
In EXO, participants make contribution choices for low (T = 21), intermediate (T =
39) and high (T = 57) thresholds. The case with T = 0 is a standard linear public
goods game and serves as a control. The subjects make contribution choices for each of
these thresholds in a randomized order. We provide no feedback about outcomes until
the end of the experiment. We chose thresholds which are divisible by N = 3 to facilitate
coordination, thus making equal contribution by all group members focal.
Each participant makes contribution choices given one refund rate, r. Refund rates
vary the cost of contributing when the public good is not provided. For example, a value
of r = 0 makes coordination failure costly because it implies that all contributions to the
public goods are \wasted" if the threshold is not reached. In contrast, a value of r = 1
implies full insurance in the sense that contributions to the public good are fully refunded
should the threshold not be met. Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the experiment.
Table 2: Parameters of the experiment
Variable Value
Endowment E 20
Group size N 3
MPCR  0.5
Threshold T f0;21;39;57g
Refund rate r f0;0:5;1g
For each threshold level, participants make only one contribution decision. The one-
shot nature of the game serves to investigate if participants are able to solve the dicult
7coordination problem absent any opportunities for communication, learning and experi-
ence.
For each threshold, subjects state their expectations on the contributions of others.
The data on beliefs enables us to evaluate best-response behavior. Beliefs are elicited by
rewarding a correct point prediction by an additional payment of 10 points. Point incomes
from all choices are converted into money and paid out at the end of the experiment
according to the exchange rate of 10 points = 0.8 Euros.
3.2 Voting on thresholds (END)
The END treatments are essentially the same as the EXO treatments except that partici-
pants vote on which threshold to implement before making contribution decisions. Voting
is over pairs of thresholds TL and TH, with TL < TH. Participants vote on all 6 pair-wise
comparisons of thresholds, i.e., TL = 0 vs. TH = 21, TL = 0 vs. TH = 39, ..., TL = 39 vs.
TH = 57. To avoid sequence eects, we randomize the order of voting over subjects. Par-
ticipants make conditional contribution decisions (i.e. according to the strategy method)
for all possible outcomes of the vote.
More specically, subjects make contributions for the case that zero, one, or two of the
others in the group vote for TH. Obviously, the outcome of the referendum may depend
on the subject's own vote. For example, if a subject has voted for TH, TH is accepted for
H i 2 f1;2g, while if the subject has voted for TL, TH is accepted only for H i = 2. The
decision screen in the experiment accounts for this fact (see Appendix).
Applying the strategy method has the important advantage that we observe choices
for all contingencies, including the cases that are not implemented. In particular, we can
analyze how the contribution behavior depends on the subject's own voting and on other
group members' voting choices. This rich data allows us to investigate the eects of voting
choices on contributions - the main purpose of the paper - in great detail. For example, it
allows us to disentangle the signaling and commitment eects discussed below. However,
the use of the strategy method has the disadvantage to make choices more complicated
- participants make 18 (6 votes  3 cases) contribution choices in END compared to 4
contribution choices in EXO - and perhaps also more cognitively demanding.
In treatment END, participants state their beliefs about the contributions by others
in the group after having made voting and contribution choices. Since the subjects make
conditional contribution decisions, they also state beliefs conditional on all possible voting
outcomes H i 2 f0;1;2g. In addition, we ask subjects to state their beliefs regarding H i,
i.e. the number of others' votes for the higher of the two thresholds, TH.
8In total, 210 (see Table 1) undergraduate students from the University of Innsbruck
participated in our computerized (z-Tree by Fischbacher 2007) experiment. A session
lasted approximately 45 minutes and the average subject earned Euro 10.2.8
4 Predictions and hypotheses
The game without a threshold (T = 0) has a unique inecient equilibrium in which all
participants contribute zero,
P
j cj = 0. The threshold public goods game with T > 0
has multiple pure-strategy equilibria (see e.g. Isaac et al. 1996). In addition to the
inecient free-riding equilibrium, there is a set of ecient equilibria that contains all fea-
sible combinations of contributions along the mutual best response where the threshold
is exactly met,
P
j cj = T. This set contains symmetric equilibria in which each partici-
pant contributes T=N and asymmetric equilibria in which participants contribute dierent
amounts.9 Because N > 0, equilibria involving positive contributions Pareto-dominate
the zero-contribution equilibrium.10
Figure 1 illustrates individual best responses for the low (T = 21), intermediate (T =
39) and high (T = 57) threshold as a function of the sum of contributions by others in
the group. The gure is drawn for  = 0:5 and N = 3. For example, at T = 21, if others'
contributions are below 10 points, the individual cost to meet the threshold exceeds the
individual benet from the public good. A rational and self-interested subject therefore
contributes zero to the public good. If others contribute between 11 and 20 points, the
best response is to contribute just as many points as needed to reach the threshold.11
For others' contributions above 20 points, the best response is to contribute zero because
his contribution is not essential for implementation of T = 21. The gure shows the
analogous best response functions for T = 39 and T = 57.
In treatment END, the game is solved by backward induction. If a majority in a group
votes for a positive threshold over the \zero threshold", this decision transforms a social
dilemma game with a unique inecient Nash equilibrium into a coordination game with
a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. It is therefore a weakly dominant strategy to vote for
8Subjects were recruited via Email. Those with experience in public good experiments were excluded
from the recruitment. The subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. We check proper understand-
ing of the instructions (which are available from the authors on demand) in a series of control questions.
The sessions did not start before all participants answered these questions correctly.
9Note that the equilibria are given by
P
j cj = 0 plus
P
j cj = T, with the additional restriction that
none of the subjects contributes more than 10 points at T = 21 and 19 points at T = 39.
10Note that for r = 1, there is a larger set of inecient equilibria. These equilibria obtain when an
ecient equilibrium is not feasible, i.e., E < (
P
j cj ci), and subject i is indierent between contributing
zero or any positive amount to the public good.
11Note that the gure only serves illustrative purposes. In the experiment subjects contribute integer
numbers as points to the public good.



















































a positive threshold if the alternative is a zero threshold. Matters are more complicated
when the vote is between two positive thresholds TL > 0 and TH > 0 because (empirically
debatable) assumptions about the equilibrium selection in the contribution stage of the
game must be made. Unless otherwise stated, we will therefore restrict our analysis to
the decisions between TL = 0 and TH > 0. The within-subject variation of the threshold
nevertheless enables us to evaluate which threshold level is most popular and to compare
this to the empirically optimal threshold.
In our one-shot design participants cannot learn from experience and the risk of mis-
coordination is therefore high. As illustrated in Figure 1, higher thresholds are associated
with higher critical levels triggering positive contributions by rational and self-interested
players. Since N > 1, the set of equilibria with higher thresholds contains equilibria that
Pareto-dominate all equilibria with lower thresholds. This fact may make these equilibria
more focal and ease the coordination problem. At the same time, if the threshold is high,
the cost of miscoordination and thus deviating from equilibrium is also high. The net
eect is therefore indeterminate and the question of which threshold level is more ecient
is fundamentally empirical.
We hypothesize that voting improves eciency by reducing the risk of miscoordination.
Our hypothesis is based on three arguments. First, the number of votes for a threshold
may provide a signal for others' cooperativeness. Second, voting may be determined
by subjects' beliefs about others' behavior as well as their personal characteristics such
as social preferences or cognitive skills. If such characteristics are relevant also for the
10behavior in the game, voting may give rise to selection eects that inuence the outcome
of the game. Finally, a subject who votes in favor of a threshold may feel committed to
also contribute to the successful provision of the public good. It is important to note that
these arguments do not univocally support a positive eect on eciency. For instance,
voters may vote strategically and send misleading signals. Moreover, depending on the
expected contributions with and without a threshold, a signal of contributions from others
can increase, decrease or leave unchanged optimal contributions (see Figure 1). The eect
of approving a threshold in a referendum is thus theoretically indeterminate and therefore
fundamentally an empirical issue.
5 Results
Section 5.1 presents the results for exogenous thresholds. Our main ndings from this
analysis are that exogenous thresholds are at best ineective (with full insurance, i.e. r =
1) and most often (in all other cases) counterproductive. Thus, exogenous thresholds do
not increase eciency in our experiment. The counterproductive eect is most pronounced
with the most ambitious threshold (T = 57). While higher thresholds tend to induce
higher expectations and somewhat higher contributions, the increase in contributions is
usually insucient to reach the more ambitious threshold as shown in section 4.2. For
example, when increasing the threshold by a factor of 2.7 from T = 21 to T = 57
with partial refund (r = 0:5), we nd that expectations increase by a factor of 1.6, and
contributions only increase by a factor of 1.4, falling clearly short of the required factor 2.7
in this example. The consequence is that the success rate, i.e. the percentage of cases in
which the threshold is reached falls from 73% to 27%, and eciency measured by average
payos falls by 23%.
Section 5.3 shows that voting on thresholds does not improve eciency of thresholds.
Again, expectations and contributions increase with chosen thresholds, but the increase
falls short of what is required to meet the more ambitious threshold. To continue the
example in the previous paragraph with moving from T = 21 to T = 57 with partial
refund (r = 0:5), eciency falls in END by 19% which is in the same ballpark as the drop
observed in EXO (23%). To explore the reasons for this result, we discuss voting behavior
and the eects of voting on expected and actual contributions.
5.1 Results in EXO
In EXO the main variables of interest are the \success rate" at a given threshold, i.e.
whether subjects manage to coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibria of the game and
11how eciency is related to various threshold levels. In addition, we are interested in how
these eects interact with the refund rate.
Figure 2 shows that average contributions monotonically increase with the threshold
at all refund rates. For example, in EXO0 with no refund (upper left panel of Figure 2),
average contributions are 6.4 without a threshold (T = 0), and increase to 8.3 (T = 21),
12.4 (T = 39), and 14.5 with the most ambitious threshold (T = 57). Pairwise tests reveal
signicance (p < 0:05) in 16 out of 18 cases.12
Figure 2 also suggests that contributions are higher with a full refund (EXO100) than
with partial or no refund. For example, at T = 57, contributions in EXO100 are 18.4
vs. 14.2 in EXO50 and 14.5 in EXO0. These ndings are in line with the conjecture
that lower refund rates increase the cost of miscoordination which makes the participants
more reluctant to contribute. These dierences are signicant at p-values of p = 0:021
and p = 0:076 (two-sided Wilcoxon ranksum test).13
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Figure 3 shows eciency as measured by the average payo in points by threshold.
The gure reveals that the payos tend to fall with thresholds with no (EXO0) and
partial (EXO50) refund, and this drop is particularly pronounced for the most ambitious
12We use a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test. The two insignicant comparisons are thresholds 39
vs. 57 in EXO0 and 0 vs. 21 in EXO100.
13Contributions in EXO0 and EXO50 are no signicantly dierent: p = 0:682.
12threshold. In these treatments, average payos at T = 57 are signicantly lower than
those for T 2 f0;21;39g (at p-values p < 0:05). With full refund (EXO100), average
payos are essentially constant across thresholds and the threshold level has therefore
virtually no impact.
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We conclude that exogenously imposing a threshold does not increase eciency and
ambitious thresholds are counterproductive absent full insurance in our design. The reason
for these ndings is that while contributions do increase with the threshold level, the
increase is often insucient to match the increase in the threshold.
Table 3 (upper panel) shows the \success rate", i.e. the share of groups who manage
to reach or surpass the threshold. With zero or partial refund, low success rates are
particularly costly because contributions are wasted in this case. The table shows that
the average success rate decreases dramatically with the size of the threshold, whereas
it clearly increases with the refund rate. Regressing individual payos on a constant,
the own contribution, and indicator variables for the thresholds and refund rates reveals
(i) signicantly lower payos under a high threshold than under zero threshold and (ii)
signicantly higher payos under a partial and full refund than under no refund (p < 0:05).
Yet, even a modest threshold under full refund does not improve eciency compared to
the standard linear public goods game (see EXO100 in Figure 3).
13Table 3: Success rates by treatment
EXO0 EXO50 EXO100 avg.
21 0.75 0.73 0.82 0.76
Threshold 39 0.58 0.55 0.82 0.65
57 0.17 0.27 0.55 0.32
avg. 0.5 0.52 0.73 0.53
END0 END50 END100 avg.
21 0.45 0.67 1.00 0.68
Threshold 39 0.38 0.62 0.73 0.57
57 0.10 0.36 0.64 0.46
avg. 0.35 0.58 0.76 0.57
5.2 Discussion of results in EXO
Why do the subjects increase their contributions with the threshold as shown in Figure
2 despite the fact that this behavior does not increase, and often reduces, their payos?
The answer to this question comes in three parts. The rst part is that the threshold
level provides a signal about others' contributions. If met, a high threshold improves
the eciency of the Pareto-superior equilibria. For some of these equilibria, a subject
may rationally expect high contributions from others. At the same time, if the threshold
is high, the cost of miscoordination and thus deviating from equilibrium is also high.
This argument might induce lower expectations. A priori, the direction of the signal is
therefore not clear. Figure 4 shows that subjects expect higher contributions by others
if the threshold is high. The gure shows the subjects' average expected contributions
per threshold and treatment. This observation indicates that the prospects of reaching
the good equilibria of the game was more salient in participants' minds than the cost of
miscoordination.
The second part of the answer concerns the subjects' reaction given their beliefs.
Table 4 shows that about a third (34% to 36%) of all subjects choose exact best responses
(=BR) to their expectations. The numbers in parentheses indicate that a sizeable fraction
of subjects within this class hold focal beliefs, i.e., beliefs about others' contribution
equivalent to 2
3T. Between 51% and 65% of subjects contribute more than their best
response (>BR). This high share of \overcontributing" subjects can be explained by
three factors. First, subjects overcontribute to avert the risk of not reaching the threshold.
Second, since the contributions can have positive externalities on others within the group,
subjects may also overcontribute due to social preferences. Finally, there may be decision
errors. However, since only few subjects contribute less than the best response (<BR)
the explanatory power of unsystematic decision errors is limited. The observation that
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many subjects hold focal beliefs to which they choose a best response, and the fact that
many subjects overcontribute given their beliefs explains why an increase in expected
contributions (see Figure 4) translates into an increase in own contributions (see Figure
2).
Table 4: Number of subjects in EXO who contribute exactly (=BR), less than (<BR),
and more than (>BR) best response towards own belief
Threshold =BR <BR >BR #obs.
T = 21 11 (6) 2 (0) 23 (6)
EXO0 T = 39 12 (7) 4 (1) 20 (2) 36
T = 57 16 (8) 3 (1) 27 (2)
T = 21 12 (8) 0 (0) 21 (0)
EXO50 T = 39 12 (10) 4 (1) 17 (0) 33
T = 57 15 (8) 2 (1) 16 (0)
T = 21 10 (7) 2 (1) 11 (1)
EXO100 T = 39 13 (11) 1 (0) 19 (0) 33
T = 57 11 (8) 1 (0) 21 (2)
Note: In parenthesis is the number of subjects who expect focal contributions (i.e., 2
3T).
The third part of the answer is that, despite the positive eects of thresholds on
15expected contributions, coordination often fails. The most likely explanation is that
expectations are imprecise and biased. The data shows a vast variation in the dierence
between expected and actual contributions: averaged over all thresholds and treatments,
the standard deviation of this dierence is 14.4 points. In addition, subjects tend to
overestimate others' contributions. On average, the subjects expect others to contribute
2.1 points more than they actually do contribute (p = 0:001, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
These gures do not come as a surprise given the ndings in the previous literature.
With best response functions that are kinked and decreasing for important ranges of
expectations, coordination is dicult especially in the one-shot game. In fact, Isaac et al.
(1989) reported success rates similar to ours' for the rst period of the repeated game.
5.3 Results in END
This section reports the results for the endogenous treatments. We rst ask which thresh-
old is most popular. We then explore how voting aects choices and eciency in the
game.
Voting and aggregate outcomes: Table 5 shows acceptance of the higher of the
two thresholds in each pairwise vote by treatment. The numbers in parenthesis show
aggregate acceptance rates. In END0 and END50, the low threshold T = 21 is clearly the
most popular as it is the unique majority winner. In all pairwise comparisons, a majority
of voters prefer TH = 21 and TH = 39 over TL = 0, and it prefers TL = 21 over TH = 39
and TH = 57. This result suggests that the subjects anticipate the risk of miscoordination
at a high threshold. Indeed, when this risk is eliminated (r = 1), the majority winner is
T = 57 in END100.
Table 5: Individual (aggregate) acceptance in percent for TH (TH > TL)
END0 END50 END100
0 vs. 21 56% (58%) 56% (50%) 69% (58%)
0 vs. 39 53% (67%) 61% (58%) 72% (83%)
0 vs. 57 31% (25%) 39% (33%) 64% (75%)
21 vs. 39 44% (50%) 31% (42%) 64% (58%)
21 vs. 57 44% (42%) 31% (33%) 67% (75%)
39 vs. 57 36% (17%) 31% (25%) 56% (58%)
Despite the support for positive thresholds, voting does not increase aggregate e-
ciency. Figure 5 shows eciency as measured by aggregate payos in the endogenous
treatments.14 The gure shows that endogenously selecting a threshold does not matter
14In principle, contributions may not only depend on the outcome of the vote but also on the baseline











































































for payos.15 As before, the reason for this outcome is that subjects often fail to reach the
threshold (see Table 3, lower panel). We now explore the eect of voting in more detail.
Signaling: As contributions are essentially driven by expected contributions, voting
may make a dierence if the voting outcome eectively signals others' contributions.
In the left panel of Figure 6 we plot subjects' expected contributions by others' voting
behavior.16 The gure shows averages over all refund rates and has been constructed as
follows. We consider the three pairwise votes between TL = 0 and TH 2 f21;39;57g, where
TH has been accepted by the group. To keep the aggregate voting outcome constant, we
concentrate on the cases where the decision maker plus at least one of the other subjects
option in the voting choice. To assure a constant default for the voting decisions, Figure 5 only shows
data for voting choices between TL = 0 and TH > 0. However, the overall picture remains the same if we
also include the data for choices between TL > 0 and TH > 0.
15We ran 12 pairwise comparisons across treatments for all 4 thresholds and 3 refund rates. These
tests show no signicant results, with only one exception: for T = 39 payos are smaller in END50 than
in EXO50 (p = 0:059, according to a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test).
16Remember that we have elicited expected and own contributions conditional on the voting behavior
of others in the group (see section 3).












































1 other subject votes YES 2 other subjects vote YES
in the group have voted for TH > 0. The bars show average expected contributions from
others (between 0 and 40 points) according to whether one or two other subjects have
voted for TH.
The results indicate a signicant signaling eect of others' voting. On average over
all decisions, an additional vote for TH from the group increases expected contributions
by 4.5 points. In addition, the eect increases with the threshold. For TH = 21 the
additional vote signals higher contributions by 3.3 points; for TH = 39 and TH = 57, the
respective numbers are 4.0 and 6.6 points.17
The right panel of Figure 6 shows a subject's own contribution by others' voting. While
the eects are less pronounced for contributions than for expectations, an additional vote
for TH signicantly increases subjects' contributions. The average contribution increases
by 1.8 points. Calculated separately by threshold level, for TH = 21, TH = 39, and
TH = 57, the respective numbers are 1.0, 1.1, and 3.8 points. Except for TH = 39
(p = 0:120), these eects are signicant at p < 0:05. Note that these results are not trivial.
According to the best response (see Figure 1), an increase in the expected contributions
does not necessarily translate into actual contributions. On the other hand, it is important
to note that the positive signalling eects of voting are insucient to increase the eciency
of subjects' play.
Selection and commitment: Voters who approve of a positive threshold may do
so because they expect suciently high contributions from others. If so, voters would
rationally select into a threshold regime according to their expectations. To evaluate this
argument empirically, Figure 7 compares the average expected as well as the average own
contributions between YES- and NO-voters. The gure has been constructed analogously
to 6. However, to keep constant the aggregate voting outcome, we now only consider the
17All these eects are signicant at p = 0:000 according to a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test.
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cases where two of the other voters in the group have voted for TH.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that YES-voters, i.e. those who themselves approve
of the high threshold, expect slightly higher contributions from others than NO-voters.
However, the dierence in expectations is small and insignicant for TH = 21 (p = 0:990)
and TH = 39 (p = 0:252). The only signicant eect occurs for TH = 57 (p = 0:012). At
least for a high threshold, this observation indicates that subjects' approval is partially
due to fact that they expect high contributions from others.
Selection into a threshold level may happen due to heterogeneous social preferences.
To obtain a measure of cooperativeness, we let the subjects to play a one-shot standard
linear public goods game prior to playing the threshold public goods game. The payos
were determined according to i = E   ci + 
P
j cj, without mention of any threshold.
The subjects did not receive feedback on the outcome of this choice until the end of the
entire experiment. The parameters and procedures were the same as the ones described
above. Using the individual-level contributions from this game as a proxy for the subjects'
cooperativeness, we nd no correlation between this variable and voting.18
In addition to selecting into a threshold level, subjects may raise their contributions
because they feel committed to their vote. The right schedule of Figure 7 shows the
average own contribution conditional on the subject's vote. It shows that YES-voters
contribute more than No-voters for TH = 21 (p = 0:063), TH = 39 (p = 0:042), and
TH = 57 (p = 0:001). While both eects seem to partially play a role, the relatively
large eect of the voting behavior on the own contributions suggests that the commit-
ment eects dominate any selection eects. Further support for this conjecture comes
from analysis of best-response behavior. Presumably, subjects who choose a threshold
18A linear probability model including a constant, the refund rate, and the threshold the subjects'
contributions to the public good does not explain any variation: the estimated parameter is 0.001 at
p = 0:684.
19based on their expectations are more likely to choose contributions in accordance with
their best response. This link is broken if a subject raises own contributions because
of a commitment with the own vote. To test, we calculate the dierence between own
contributions and the best response towards expected contributions from others. We nd
that NO-voters deviate by less from their best response than YES-voters (2.76 vs. 5.78
points, p = 0:030), thus providing further evidence for a commitment eect.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the eect of introducing a threshold into a public goods game by voting.
A priori, this is a promising approach when there is no predened threshold for techno-
logical reasons, participants can be identied (and can vote) but where there's no central
authority with the power to enforce contributions or punish non-compliance. Examples
range from the small (e.g. a fund-raising drive to start a community library only if a
sucient amount is raised to buy some minimal number of books) to the large (e.g. a
voluntary agreement of nations to reach a minimum abatement of greenhouse gases).
We nd that accepting a threshold has signicant signaling and commitment eects,
but these eects are insucient to improve the eciency of public-good provision in our
design. In both endogenous and exogenous conditions, participants in our experiment are
challenged to solve a dicult coordination problem absent previous experience, oppor-
tunities for communicating or learning from mistakes within the game, and in a rather
complex (we use the strategy method) and context-free (we use neutral wording in the
presentation of the situation to participants). These design aspects suggest that we pro-
vide a demanding test for the eciency-improving eect of voting on thresholds. However,
our design can also be considered to be favorable for coordination since the players were
symmetric, i.e. the endowments, costs of contributing and benets from the provision
of the public good were the same for all participants, and the symmetry was common
information. In addition, the thresholds to choose from were divisible by N which should
have made equal contributions to reach the threshold focal. In most naturally occurring
examples such as donations for a community library or greenhouse gas abatement on a
global level, players are not symmetric. For example, in the context of abatement, some
countries are large (i.e. their emissions are large) and some are poor (i.e. their opportu-
nity cost of abatement is high), and to some both or neither applies. In this situation,
coordination can be expected to be more dicult than in our experiment because equal
contributions are neither focal nor fair.
In summary, we provide the rst study to show that introducing thresholds, both
imposed or approved in a referendum, is no sure cure for the inecient voluntary provision
of public goods when no other, more intervention-intense, mechanism is available. An
20interesting alley for further research is to investigate the robustness of this result by
adding more context (e.g. in a eld experiment), allowing for learning (e.g. in a repeated
laboratory experiment), making contributions sequentially, or by adding opportunities for
communication.
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